ABSTRACT: This paper investigates whether managers have varying degrees of influence when they provide earnings guidance. The findings suggest that analysts are more skeptical of managers' earnings guidance when it is less likely to be reliable. The findings also suggest that exhibiting greater skepticism in the face of managers' earnings guidance is detrimental to analysts from an earnings-forecasting standpoint, but this effect is isolated to firms with poorer-quality analyst coverage. Lastly, the findings provide evidence that investors initially overweight managers' earnings guidance versus analyst earnings estimates with this effect being more pronounced for firms having greater visibility in the capital markets.
I. Introduction
The practice of managers providing guidance to the capital markets about future performance has become widespread. For example, a 1998 survey by the National Investor Relations Institute found that 79 percent of 2,600 public companies always or usually comment on analyst earnings estimates (Schonfeld 1998) . Guidance can be carried out through a variety of communication channels, including press releases, conference calls, or informal one-on-one conversations between managers and analysts.
The nature of information provided via guidance can also vary widely. Such information might consist of specific numerical predictions or vague qualitative disclosures.
Many prior studies on guidance have focused on establishing that managers' predictions about future performance have information content. Hassell et al. (1988) and Baginski and Hassell (1990) document significant revisions in analyst earnings estimates around management earnings forecasts. Moreover, Bowen et al. (1999) find that analysts significantly revise their earnings estimates around conference calls. Patell (1976) , Waymire (1984) , Lev and Penman (1990) , Baginski et al. (1993) , Skinner (1994) , and Kasznik and Lev (1995) find that stock prices move significantly on the days surrounding management earnings forecasts. In addition, Frankel et. al (1999) document significant stock price reactions to conference calls.
Overall, existing evidence indicates that capital market participants consider various types of guidance to be informative. However, relatively little work has been done to date that tests if guidance has systematically varying degrees of influence. This paper investigates whether characteristics of guidance as well as characteristics of the environment in which guidance is provided have an impact on how it is perceived. Using a sample of 969 management earnings forecasts issued between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 1997, this paper addresses three questions: 1.) What factors affect how much analysts react to information contained in managers' earnings guidance?, 2.) Does the extent to which analysts heed managers' earnings guidance affect the accuracy of their post-guidance earnings estimates?, and 3.) How do investors reconcile differences in opinion between managers and analysts about upcoming earnings?
The findings suggest that analysts exhibit greater skepticism towards managers' earnings guidance when it is less likely to be reliable. Management earnings forecasts produce smaller revisions in analyst earnings estimates for a given level of news when issued over longer horizons by firms with lower analyst following, greater operational uncertainty, and managers who aggressively bias their predictions relative to actual earnings. Analysts are more skeptical of management earnings forecasts that contain good news, which is consistent with the findings in Hassell et al. (1988) . Increased usefulness of previously provided guidance results in analysts more fully adopting the amounts predicted in management earnings forecasts, but this association is not statistically significant as shown in Williams (1996) .
The findings also suggest that exhibiting greater skepticism in the face of managers' earnings guidance is detrimental to analysts from an earnings-forecasting standpoint. The less analysts revise their earnings estimates for a given level of management earnings forecast news, the worse is the accuracy of their post-guidance earnings estimates versus managers' predictions. However, once firms lacking timely analyst coverage are excluded from the analysis, this association disappears. Thus, skepticism towards managers' earnings guidance on the part of analysts seems to be appropriately characterized as a "healthy disagreement" in most instances.
Lastly, the findings provide evidence on how investors reconcile differences in opinion between analysts and managers about upcoming earnings. It appears that investors initially overweight managers' predictions relative to post-guidance analyst earnings estimates. Controlling for the news content of management earnings forecasts, differences between managers' predictions and post-guidance analyst earnings estimates are negatively associated with subsequent abnormal returns. This association is particularly strong for firms where managers are likely to possess a greater amount of visibility in the capital markets.
The next section describes the sample selection procedure and provides descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the research design and empirical findings.
Section 4 offers some concluding thoughts.
II. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
The management earnings forecast sample used in this paper is constructed from a database of earnings pre-announcements maintained by First Call Corporation. An earnings pre-announcement is defined as any managerial statement about earnings that is disclosed before the release of actual earnings for the corresponding fiscal period. This paper analyzes only pre-announcements made prior to the fiscal period end. Such preannouncements correspond to the most common definition of a management earnings forecast in the accounting literature.
The sample of management earnings forecasts consists of 969 observations. Table 1 describes the construction of this sample. The First Call database provides broad coverage of earnings pre-announcements beginning in 1995. To ensure the availability of stock return and accounting data, December 31, 1997 is chosen as the sample period cutoff date. Over the three-year period between 1995 and 1997, only those management earnings forecasts that consist of point-or range-format predictions are examined. The midpoint of the upper and lower bounds of range-format predictions is used as a measure of managers' earnings expectations. Other forecast formats, such as minimum and maximum predictions, are excluded from the analysis out of concern that they do not provide an unbiased measure of managers' earnings expectations.
Long-term management earnings forecasts (i.e., those issued more than one fiscal year in advance)
are also omitted from the sample. These observations are excluded because very few analysts provide earnings estimates so far in advance of fiscal period ends, which makes it difficult to get a precise measure of analysts' earnings expectations in these instances. showing that firms, at least historically, have not adopted regular policies of providing forward-looking information about earnings in either point-or range-format predictions (Kile et al. 1998) . Table 2 Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on various characteristics of the sample firms as well as the sample management earnings forecasts. SURPRISE measures the difference between the amount predicted in the management earnings forecast and the prevailing consensus analyst earnings estimate at the time of the prediction. On average, the sample management earnings forecasts convey bad news as indicated by the negative mean and median of SURPRISE. The mean of this variable is -$0.081 while its median is -$0.040. The fact that the sample management earnings forecasts convey bad news, on average, is confirmed by the negative mean and median of MFCAR. This variable, which measures the three-trading-day cumulative abnormal return around a management earnings forecast, has a mean of -6.08 percent and a median of -2.86 percent. These findings on the news content of management earnings forecasts are consistent with other recent studies of these disclosures (Baginski et al. 1993 , Skinner 1994 , Kasznik and Lev 1995 , Kile et al. 1998 
III. Research Design and Empirical Findings
Determinants of managers' influence on analyst earnings estimates Verrecchia (1983) proposes a model of voluntary disclosure in which a primary factor determining the weight placed on some signal about the future payoff to a risky asset is the precision of the signal. The model in Verrecchia (1983) ( 1) where:
MBIAS equals SIGNMERR if SURPRISE is greater than zero and SIGNMERR * -1
if SURPRISE is less than zero.
PRECAR is the cumulative abnormal return beginning one trading day after the date associated with the prevailing consensus analyst earnings estimate for the fiscal period in question and ending two trading days before the management earnings forecast.
POSTCAR is the cumulative abnormal return beginning two trading days after the management earnings forecast and ending one trading day before the first subsequent analyst earnings estimate revision for the fiscal period in question.
All other variables are defined as in table 3.
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RATIO is designed to capture how much of the information contained in management earnings forecasts gets reflected in post-guidance analyst earnings estimates.
The cumulative distribution of this variable is described in figure 1. As evidenced in this figure, the median value of RATIO is one, which indicates that analysts, on average, exactly adopt the numbers provided in management earnings forecasts. The median value of one for this variable implies that analysts are as likely to over-react versus under-react to managers' earnings guidance. Except for a few exceptions, RATIO is essentially uniformly distributed. Relatively large numbers of observations are clustered at the values of zero and one. In addition, approximately seven percent of the sample has values of either less than zero or greater than two. Because some of the observations in the tails of the distribution take on extreme values, RATIO is transformed into a percentile rank for the purpose of the regression described in eq. (1) and all subsequent analyses.
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The first set of variables included in eq. (1) is designed to proxy for the uncertainty of the environment in which managers' earnings guidance is provided. These
variables include ln(HORIZON), D_SPEC, RETVOL, DISPERSION, BMRATIO, ln(ANALYSTS), and REPUTATION.
6 As the length of time increases between when managers provide guidance and actual earnings are realized, the chance for forecasting errors by managers increases, thereby rendering their predictions less reliable. This 4 To control for scale differences across observations, MBIAS and SURPRISE are measured as a percentage of PRICE. Similarly, REPUTATION is measured as a percentage of the forecasting firm's stock price just prior to the previously issued management earnings forecast. 5 Other treatments of outliers in RATIO were also examined. One approach involved windsorizing observations less than zero or greater than two. Another approach involved deleting these observations from the sample. These alternative approaches produced qualitatively similar findings to those reported. 6 The logarithmic specifications of HORIZON and ANALYSTS are designed to limit the effect of large argument implies a negative coefficient on ln (HORIZON To the extent that it is more prone to error, managers' earnings guidance provided when there is greater uncertainty is predicted to elicit greater skepticism on the part of analysts.
This would result in negative coefficients on D_SPEC, RETVOL, and DISPERSION and a positive coefficient on BMRATIO.
Although greater uncertainty is likely to make managers' earnings guidance less reliable, it is in these exact circumstances where analysts might also have relatively low confidence in their own earnings estimates. All else equal, guidance provided by managers should have relatively greater influence when analysts have relatively low confidence in their own earnings estimates. This implies a positive association between RATIO and ln(HORIZON), D_SPEC, RETVOL, and DISPERSION and a negative association between this variable and BMRATIO. Also, because managers can observe the forecasting environment before deciding whether or not to make a prediction, those that chose to do so are presumably the ones with the most confidence in their estimates.
Because of this self-selection, there could be no observable association between the influence of managers' earnings guidance and the uncertainty of the environment in outliers on the regression findings. 7 It has been argued that lower values of this variable proxy for higher growth prospects (Collins and which it is provided. The signs on ln(HORIZON), D_SPEC, RETVOL, DISPERSION, and BMRATIO in eq. (1) is ultimately an empirical question.
The association between RATIO and ln(ANALYSTS) is subject to a similar caveat.
The amount of information being produced about a firm likely increases with analyst following. For firms with greater amounts of available information, analysts will have more confidence in their own earnings estimates, thereby reducing the influence of managers' earnings guidance. This argument implies a negative coefficient on
ln(ANALYSTS).
Alternatively, large firms with extensive analyst coverage are likely to suffer the most significant reputation costs for misleading earnings guidance and, therefore, have the greatest incentive to be accurate. Greater reliability on the part of managers when analyst following is relatively high would result in a positive coefficient
REPUTATION is the final variable in eq.
(1) that describes a characteristic of the environment in which managers' earnings guidance is provided. Based on the findings in Williams (1996) , the sign on this variable is predicted to be positive. The argument underlying this prediction is that managers' are more effective at influencing analyst earnings estimates as the accuracy of their previously provided guidance improves.
The next set of variables included in eq.
(1) pertains to characteristics of managers' earnings guidance. The first of these variables, SURPRISE, has been identified by prior research to be associated with how closely analysts revise their earnings estimates to match the amounts predicted in managers' earnings guidance. Hassell et al. (1988) find that revisions in analyst earnings estimates around management earnings forecasts are smaller in absolute magnitude when the information contained in Kothari 1989) .
the prediction consists of bad news. Thus, the coefficient on SURPRISE is predicted to be negative.
The next variable in eq. (1), MBIAS, is included in the regression specification to take into account any potential bias that might be introduced into managers' earnings guidance. Matsumoto (1999) presents evidence that is consistent with managers guiding analyst earnings estimates in order to produce a positive surprise when actual earnings are announced. MBIAS is designed to capture how cautiously managers guide analysts away from their prevailing consensus earnings estimates and toward actual earnings. For example, if prevailing analyst EPS estimates are $1.00, the amount predicted in a management earnings forecast is $2.00, and actual earnings turn out to be $2.50, MBIAS would equal $0.50=$2.50-$2.00. Similarly, if prevailing analyst EPS estimates are $1.00, the amount predicted in a management earnings forecast is $0.00, and actual earnings turn out to be -$0.50, MBIAS would also equal $0.50=(-$0.50-$0.00) * -1. Hassell et al. (1988) find that analysts are able to distinguish between management earnings forecasts that are ex-post more accurate and those that are ex-post less accurate than their own prevailing consensus earnings estimates. MBIAS is designed to test a similar concept. Namely, this ex-post measure is included in eq. (1) to proxy for analysts' ex-ante expectations regarding differences in managers' tendencies to bias their guidance relative to actual earnings. If analysts are able to anticipate when managers are likely to bias their earnings guidance, the coefficient on MBIAS is predicted to be positive. A positive coefficient implies that analysts more fully adopt managers' earnings guidance when such guidance provides a more cautious adjustment away from prevailing consensus analyst earnings estimates and towards actual earnings.
D_RANGE is included in eq.
(1) to control for differences in the precision of earnings information disclosed by managers. Baginski and Hassell (1997) (1) is an empirical question.
Lastly, several control variables are included in eq.
(1). D_QTR is included in the regression specification to ensure that any findings are not driven by an incomplete analysis of quarterly versus annual forecasts. The purpose of PRECAR is to control for information that becomes known between the dates of the pre-guidance prevailing consensus analyst earnings estimate and the management earnings forecast. The purpose of POSTCAR is to control for information that is made public after the management earnings forecast but before analysts revise their earnings estimates. We include these two stock return variables to alleviate concerns that our findings could be due to analysts reacting to information other than that contained in the management earnings forecasts. Further attempts were made to replicate the findings in Williams (1996) without success. These included removing all other independent variables from the regressions containing REPUTATION and only including observations in the regression with previously provided guidance. These changes were made to more closely replicate the empirical design in Williams (1996) . Time period differences between the two samples remains as a possible explanation for the discrepancy between the two sets of findings. 10 If one-tailed tests of significance are used because of the unambiguous directional prediction for this variable, SURPRISE is statistically significant at conventional levels in all four regression in table 4.
appears that the strength of the association between analyst earnings estimate revisions around management earnings forecasts and the news content of these predictions is partially driven by the lack of timely analyst coverage at forecasting firms.
The variable MBIAS, designed to take into account potential bias in managers' earnings guidance, has coefficients that range in value from 0.0556 to 0.0876 and that are statistically significant at the 0.01 level in all four regression described in table 4. The positive sign of the coefficients for this variable indicates that analysts are more likely to adopt managers' earnings guidance that ex-post provides a relatively cautious adjustment away from prevailing consensus analyst earnings estimates and towards actual earnings.
Thus, it appears that analysts are able to at least partially anticipate forecasting biases in managers' earnings guidance and adjust for it in their post-guidance earnings estimates.
This finding is similar in spirit to one in Hassell et al. (1988) in which analysts are shown to distinguish between management earnings forecasts that are ex-post more accurate and those that are ex-post less accurate than their prevailing consensus earnings estimates.
Table 4
The coefficients on D_RANGE are positive and significant in all four regressions described in table 4. These coefficients vary between 0.0641 and 0.1004, indicating that values of RATIO are between 6-10 percent higher for management earnings forecasts that consist of range-versus point-format predictions. Higher values of RATIO imply that analysts are less skeptical of range-format predictions. This finding suggests that although previous research has found that range-format predictions are issued at times of greater uncertainty, analysts do not appear to find them less reliable than point-format predictions. One explanation for this finding is that the times when managers choose to make range-format predictions are also the times when analysts are less certain about their own earnings estimates, thereby increasing the usefulness of any signal from managers. Another explanation for this finding is that analysts do not regard the midpoint of range-format predictions to be an unbiased measure of managerial earnings expectations. Instead, the number towards which analysts gravitate is slightly higher than the midpoint.
The coefficients for the control variables in eq. (1), D_QTR, PRECAR, and POSTCAR, are statistically insignificant in all four regressions described in table 4.
Analysts do not appear to revise their earnings estimates differently when management earnings forecasts pertain to fiscal years versus quarters. In addition, the statistical insignificance of the coefficients on PRECAR and POSTCAR suggest that any interim news disclosed between the dates when the management earnings forecast and pre-and post-guidance analyst earnings estimates are made is not associated with RATIO.
Forecasting-accuracy impact of analyst skepticism towards managers' earnings guidance
The findings from the previous section reveal that managers possess varying degrees of influence with analysts when providing earnings guidance. The analysis in this section is concerned with determining whether analysts pay less attention to management earnings forecasts in situations where these predictions turn out to be relatively less informative or whether analysts end up ignoring what proves to be useful information from managers. To address this issue, we construct a measure of relative forecast accuracy (ACCURACY) that compares the accuracy of managers' earnings guidance to post-guidance analyst earnings estimates. Next, we examine the association between ACCURACY and RATIO, our measure of how fully analysts adopt the amounts predicted in management earnings forecasts. The model takes the following form:
where:
ACCURACY and RATIO are defined as in table 3 and figure 1.
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ACCURACY increases as the forecasting error in post-guidance analyst earnings estimates declines versus managers' predictions. Thus, a positive coefficient on RATIO would indicate that more skeptical analysts are less accurate than they could have been if they had fully adopted the information contained in management earnings forecasts.
The first column of table 5 shows the full-sample findings for the regression described in eq. (2). The coefficient on RATIO equals 0.1129 and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that when analysts more fully embrace managers' earnings guidance, the accuracy of their post-guidance earnings estimates increases relative to managers' predictions. The second column of table 5 re-examines the association between ACCURACY and RATIO after excluding those observations from the full sample where no analysts revise their earnings estimates within one month of the management earnings forecast. The coefficient on RATIO is insignificantly different from zero in this regression, which suggests that the full-sample finding in column one is primarily driven by analysts who fail to revise their earnings estimates after a management earnings forecast.
Table 5
Evidence from previous studies suggests that many characteristics of a firm's information environment vary with the number of analysts following a firm (Bhushan 1989 , Lang and Lundholm 1996 , Walther 1997 The coefficient on RATIO in this regression is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that skepticism towards managers' earnings guidance on the part of analysts in firms with higher analyst following does not affect their earnings-forecasting accuracy relative to that of managers. Lastly, the coefficient on D_LOW is negative and statistically significant at the 0.09 level. A negative coefficient on D_LOW indicates that analysts at more widely followed firms have unconditionally more accurate postguidance earnings estimates versus managers' predictions. Possible explanations for this last finding include greater competition among analysts at firms with higher levels of coverage or higher quality analysts choosing to cover firms that attract greater attention in the capital markets.
Relative influence of managers versus analysts on investors' earnings expectations
The findings from the two previous sections reveal differences in managers' ability to influence analysts' earnings estimates and that such differences have implications for the relative forecasting accuracy of managers versus analysts. The final part of our analysis involves examining how investors reconcile differences between managers' earnings guidance and post-guidance analyst earnings estimates.
Prior research has shown that investors find management earnings forecasts to be informative (Patell 1976 , Waymire 1984 , Baginski et al. 1993 , Lev and Penman 1990 , Skinner 1994 , Kasznik and Lev 1995 . In addition, other research has documented significant stock price reactions to both analyst earnings estimate revisions as well as their stock recommendations (Givoly and Lakonishok 1979 , Lys and Sohn 1990 , Beneish 1991 , Francis and Soffer 1997 . However, no research of which we are aware has attempted to assess how investors reconcile signals from managers and analysts about upcoming earnings when they differ. Thus, we attempt to bring together these two lines of research by providing evidence on investors' reaction to the joint event of managers providing earnings guidance and analysts responding to it.
Because the amounts predicted in managers' earnings guidance as well as analyst earnings estimates are observable by investors, efficient markets would dictate that the implications of a divergence in these two sources of information would be correctly and quickly impounded into stock prices. Alternatively, the divergence in beliefs between managers and analysts might result in confusion among investors, causing them to fixate initially, perhaps incorrectly so, on either one of these two different predictions about upcoming earnings. Whether either of these scenarios is an accurate description of investor behavior is ultimately an empirical question.
In an attempt to provide empirical evidence on this issue, we test whether differences between managers' predictions and post-guidance analyst earnings estimates are associated with subsequent abnormal returns. The regression model takes the following form:
FPCAR measures the cumulative abnormal return beginning one trading day after the post-guidance analyst earnings estimate is made and ending one trading day after the earnings announcement for the fiscal period to which the management earnings forecast applies.
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Efficient markets would predict that the coefficient on DIFF should not be significantly different from zero, as future abnormal stock returns should not be predictable from publicly available information. Alternatively, if investors do not properly interpret DIFF when setting stock prices but instead initially overweight the information in managers' earnings guidance (post-guidance analyst earnings estimates), the sign on the coefficient for DIFF is predicted to be negative (positive). McNichols (1989) finds that abnormal stock returns subsequent to management earnings forecasts exhibit a pattern similar to post-earnings-announcement drift.
Specifically, abnormal stock returns following a management earnings forecast are shown to be are positively associated with the news content of the prediction. To control for this potentially confounding influence on post-guidance abnormal stock returns, SURPRISE is included in eq. (4). Table 6 presents the findings from the regression model described in eq. (4). The first column describes the results for the full-sample regression.
14 The coefficient on DIFF equals -3.628 and is statistically significant at the 0.06 level. The value on this coefficient implies that a one percent increase in DIFF is associated with over a three percent decline in subsequent abnormal stock returns, which is consistent with investors initially overweighting managers' earnings guidance. This association holds despite a statistically significant coefficient on SURPRISE. As in McNichols (1989) , there is a positive association between the news content of management earnings forecasts and subsequent abnormal returns.
The second column of table 6 re-estimates the same regression but limits the sample to only those observations where analysts explicitly revise their earnings 14 The number of observations in this regression is 958 even though there are 969 sample management earnings forecasts. This discrepancy occurs because for eleven observations, analyst earnings estimate revisions after the management forecast occurred during the three-trading-day earnings announcement period. These observations were eliminated. However, it should be noted that including them in the regression does not qualitatively affect the findings.
estimates. Interestingly, the positive association between FPCAR and DIFF is stronger in this sub-sample. This finding indicates that the regression results from column one are not affected by the timeliness of analyst coverage. In fact, it suggests that investors rely too heavily on managers' earnings guidance at firms that have sufficient visibility in the capital markets to attract greater attention from analysts.
Table 6
To provide further empirical evidence on this issue, we estimate a variation of the regression described in eq. (4) in which the association between FPCAR and DIFF is allowed to vary with the level of analyst following. The model takes the following form:
All variables are defined as before.
The results from the regression described in eq. (5) estimated using only observations with responsive analyst are reported in column three of table 6. Several interesting findings emerge from this regression. The coefficient on DIFF has a value of -10.448 and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This coefficient describes the association between FPCAR and DIFF for the sub-set of observations where D_LOW equals zero. The statistical significance of this coefficient provides further support to the finding in column two that investors more strongly overweight managers' earnings guidance at firms with greater visibility in the capital markets. The sum of the coefficients on DIFF and DIFF * D_LOW describe the association between FPCAR and DIFF for the sub-set of observations where D_LOW equals one. The sum of these coefficients is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels, suggesting that investors do not fixate on managers' earnings guidance at firms with lower levels of analyst following. These firms are smaller, and mangers at them presumably lack the capital-markets presence of their counterparts at more-established companies.
D_LOW measures the difference in FPCAR between firms with high and low levels of analyst following. The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant at the 0.02 level. A possible explanation for this finding is that analyst following is associated with firm size and that large firms had superior stock price performance over the sample period. Neither coefficient on the variables containing SURPRISE is statistically significant in this regression specification.
IV. Conclusions
This paper examines if the influence of managers' earnings guidance on analyst earnings estimates varies systematically with characteristics of the guidance or characteristics of the environment in which the guidance is provided. The findings suggest that managers have greater difficulty in swaying analyst earnings estimates when the reliability of their earnings guidance is likely to be lower. This finding has significant implications for managers deciding whether to provide guidance. Namely, it suggests that when guidance would presumably be most useful, when uncertainty about future earnings is relatively high, analysts place less weight on earnings predictions made by managers. A productive avenue for future research on guidance would be to examine in greater detail other managerial actions taken in conjunction with providing guidance, such as describing the underlying assumptions behind their predictions. Such an analysis could shed light on whether managers can affect their influence with analysts even in environments of relatively high uncertainty.
The findings also suggest that analysts who are more skeptical of managers' earnings guidance have higher post-guidance forecasting errors relative to managers.
However, this finding is driven primarily by firms with smaller analyst following and less attentive analysts. Thus, it appears that for firms with poorer quality analyst coverage, managers have difficulty influencing analyst earnings estimates even though analysts would apparently benefit from more fully adopting their guidance.
While some analysts appear to ignore information that would improve their forecasting accuracy, the findings also suggest that investors have difficulty in sorting out differences between managers' earnings guidance and post-guidance analyst earnings estimates. Investors appear to initially overweight the information contained in management earnings forecasts. Interestingly, this finding is primarily driven by firms with high levels of analyst coverage where managers presumably command greater attention from the capital markets. HORIZON is the number of trading days between the management earnings forecast and the end of the fiscal period to which the prediction applies. D_SPEC takes on the value of one (zero otherwise) if the forecasting firm's earnings from any of the four fiscal quarters prior to the one containing the management earnings forecast included special items. D_NEG takes on the value of one (zero otherwise) if SURPRISE is less than zero. D_RANGE takes on the value of one (zero otherwise) if the management earnings forecast is a rangeformat prediction. D_QTR takes on the value of one (zero otherwise) if the management earnings forecast pertains to a fiscal quarter. 
